Screenshots get taken apart in Bermuda.
ProofSnap doesn't.

ProofSnap is a Chrome and Edge extension that captures web pages as legal evidence with blockchain timestamping, so the authenticity and integrity of the files can be checked independently.

ProofSnap uses OpenTimestamps to anchor a SHA-256 hash of your evidence to the Bitcoin blockchain, creating a cryptographic proof of when the capture was made. This timestamp is independently verifiable and cannot be backdated or tampered with, providing independently checkable proof that your evidence existed at a specific point in time.

ProofSnap includes a 7-day free trial with all plans. The trial requires a credit card, and you are not charged if you cancel before it ends. Choose from flexible monthly or annual subscriptions: Essential, $8.99 per month or $80 per year; Professional, $16.99 per month or $160 per year; Enterprise, $28.99 per month or $280 per year. Annual plans save 20%.

ProofSnap generates forensically sound evidence with cryptographic proofs aligned with eIDAS 2 standards for qualified timestamps and digital signatures. Admissibility depends on jurisdiction and specific legal requirements. Consult a Bermuda barrister and attorney about your own matter.

Regular screenshots can be challenged in court because they carry no proof of when they were taken or whether they have been altered. In Bermuda the first half of that problem is largely solved for you: section 14(1) of the Electronic Transactions Act 1999 stops the rules of evidence denying admissibility just because a record is electronic, so a capture gets in. What remains is the half that decides cases. Section 14(2) asks how reliably the record was generated and stored, how reliably its integrity was maintained, and how the originator was identified, and section 27E(2)(c) of the Evidence Act 1905 asks whether the computer was operating properly. Each of those is a technical fact you can demonstrate or fail to demonstrate.

ProofSnap addresses this by creating a forensic evidence package containing a SHA-256 hash proving the content has not been modified, an RSA-4096 digital signature for authenticity, an eIDAS qualified timestamp issued by Disig a.s., a Qualified Trust Service Provider on the EU Trusted List, a Bitcoin blockchain anchor, and full metadata including the URL and the capture time in UTC. The presumption goes to the time and the integrity of the data rather than to admissibility generally or to the truth of what the page said, so a court or an adjudicator still weighs the evidence. What it removes is the argument about when the capture was made and whether it changed afterwards.

No, and we will not pretend otherwise. Bermuda is a British Overseas Territory and is not in the EU, so the presumption in Article 41(2) of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 does not run here. Any vendor telling a Bermuda practitioner that an EU regulation gives their screenshot a presumption in Hamilton is going to be caught by opposing counsel.

What the timestamp is, honestly, is an independent third-party attestation of time and integrity from a Qualified Trust Service Provider on the EU Trusted List, verifiable offline by anyone. In Bermuda that is not a presumption, it is evidential weight, and it happens to answer the two limbs section 14(2) of the Electronic Transactions Act 1999 names first: the reliability of the manner in which the record was generated, and the reliability of the manner in which its integrity was maintained. We are not claiming privilege the statute does not give. We are handing the court the factors its own statute asks about.

ProofSnap uses three layers of cryptographic protection:

1. SHA-256 Hashing: Every file in the evidence package is hashed. Changing even a single pixel or character produces a completely different hash, making any tampering immediately detectable.
2. Digital Signature: The manifest (listing all files and their hashes) is digitally signed with a private key. The corresponding public key is included for anyone to verify authenticity.
3. Blockchain Timestamp: The manifest hash is anchored to the Bitcoin blockchain via OpenTimestamps, creating an immutable record of when the evidence was captured. This timestamp cannot be forged or backdated.

Together, these mechanisms create a chain of integrity that proves that the evidence is authentic and unaltered, and that it was captured at a specific point in time.

Regulation (EU) 2024/1183, known as eIDAS 2, will be fully rolled out by the end of 2026, establishing stricter standards for electronic identification, digital signatures, and qualified electronic timestamps across all EU member states.

Under Article 41(2), a qualified electronic time stamp shall enjoy the presumption of the accuracy of the date and the time it indicates and the integrity of the data to which the date and time are bound. That presumption operates in the European Union. It does not reach Bermuda, which is a British Overseas Territory and has never been part of the EU, so before a Bermuda court the qualified timestamp is corroboration of time and integrity rather than a statutory presumption. Section 14(2) of the Electronic Transactions Act 1999 is what a Bermuda court actually applies, and it asks about exactly the reliability and integrity the timestamp evidences.

ProofSnap's cryptographic proofs align with eIDAS 2 requirements: SHA-256 hashing for data integrity, RSA-4096 digital signatures for authenticity, and blockchain timestamps via OpenTimestamps for independent time verification. Each of those is verifiable offline by anyone, which is what makes the package useful in a Bermuda proceeding and, where a matter also touches Europe, in an EU one.

Usually yes, and then the real argument starts. Section 14(1) of the Electronic Transactions Act 1999 says the rules of evidence cannot deny admissibility to an electronic record solely because it is an electronic record, or because it is not in its original form where it is the best evidence you could reasonably be expected to obtain. So getting in is rarely the problem.

Section 14(2) is the part that decides what your exhibit is worth. It directs the court to weigh the reliability of the manner in which the record was generated, stored or communicated, the reliability of the manner in which its integrity was maintained, the manner in which the originator was identified, and any other relevant factor. A bare screenshot answers none of those. A ProofSnap package answers the first three from the file itself, through the chain of custody and forensic log, the SHA-256 hash of every file with the RSA-4096 signed manifest, and the public key that travels with the package.

Bermuda kept the statutory computer-evidence route that England repealed on 31 January 1997. Section 27E of the Evidence Act 1905 makes a statement in a computer-produced document admissible in civil proceedings, subject to the rules of court, if four conditions are met: that the document was produced by a computer used regularly to store or process information for activities regularly carried on; that information of that kind was regularly supplied to it in the ordinary course of those activities; that the computer was operating properly throughout the material part of that period, or that any malfunction did not affect the production of the document or the accuracy of its contents; and that the information reproduces or derives from information supplied in the ordinary course of those activities.

This matters more in Bermuda than the equivalent would elsewhere, because section 27A allows hearsay in civil proceedings by statute or by agreement of the parties, "but not otherwise". There is no general common law fallback. Note also that section 27E is a facts-only route: section 27L applies Part IIA to statements of opinion "except section 27E".

Yes, and this is the provision worth knowing. Section 27E(4) lets you put in a certificate that identifies the document containing the statement and describes the manner in which it was produced, gives such particulars of any device involved as are appropriate to show the document was produced by a computer, and deals with the section 27E(2) conditions. It has to be signed by someone occupying a responsible position in relation to the operation of the device or the management of the relevant activities, and it is enough for a matter to be stated to the best of that person's knowledge and belief.

Read that list next to what a ProofSnap package already contains and the overlap is close to line for line. The chain of custody document describes the manner of production, including any layout or overlay neutralisation that was applied and then restored. The forensic log with its hash chain and the extension integrity record are the particulars of the device. The Provenance Certificate and its integrity checks speak to whether the system was operating properly and whether anything affected the accuracy of the contents. We do not write your certificate for you, and we do not sign it. We give you the material it has to be built from.

Bermuda has no local equivalent of the English practice direction on electronic disclosure, so there is no default protocol and parties agree bespoke terms case by case. That sounds like flexibility until you are the one who has to explain how a document was captured, at which point the absence of a standard means the method itself is on the table.

What you want to be able to annex is a described, repeatable process rather than an assertion. A ProofSnap package documents the process it used, hashes every file with SHA-256, signs the manifest with an RSA-4096 key, ships the public key alongside it and includes verification scripts the other side can run without installing anything of ours. Discovery here still follows the old Peruvian Guano train-of-enquiry test under Order 24 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1985, so the volume of potentially discoverable electronic material is wide. A capture method you can describe once and reuse is worth more than a folder of screenshots nobody can account for.

That is the objection every screenshot invites, and with a plain image there is no answer to it beyond your own word. In Bermuda the allegation is that the file was altered after capture, and that is answered with bytes, not with credibility.

A ProofSnap package answers the objection from the file. Every file carries a SHA-256 hash, the manifest listing those hashes is signed with an RSA-4096 key, the public key travels with the package, and the verification scripts recompute all of it in front of whoever is asking. Change one pixel and the hash no longer matches. That is also what lets you speak to section 27E(2)(c), whether the computer was operating properly, and to the four fields an Order 38 rule 24 notice asks for.

Because Bermuda's statute says so, twice, in different places. Section 27F(3)(c) makes the weight of a computer statement turn on whether the information was recorded contemporaneously with the facts it deals with, and on whether any person concerned with supplying information to the computer or operating it "had any incentive to conceal or misrepresent the facts". Separately, section 69(3) shuts out from the older documentary route any statement made by a person interested at a time when proceedings were pending or anticipated.

The practical reading is the same either way: a capture made before a dispute crystallises is worth more than one assembled after it. The incentive limb is also the objection an opponent will aim at any capture made by the party who benefits from it, and the answer is not to protest good faith. It is that the time and the integrity were fixed by parties outside the dispute, by a Bitcoin block through OpenTimestamps and by a qualified timestamp from Disig a.s., a Qualified Trust Service Provider on the EU Trusted List whose status anyone can check. Nobody in the litigation could have moved either one.

Order 38 rule 24 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1985 prescribes what a notice relying on computer-produced evidence must contain: the responsible person, who supplied the information to the computer, who operated the device, and a statement whether it was operating properly. Nobody has published what those four fields look like for a web capture, which is why practitioners improvise.

A ProofSnap package fills them mechanically. The responsible person is whoever ran the capture and signs the certificate. The information supplied to the computer is the HTTP response recorded in the forensic log, with the DNS, WHOIS and TLS data alongside it. The device is described in the extension integrity record, with the browser, operating system and extension version. And proper operation is what the Provenance Certificate and its eight integrity checks speak to. We do not draft the notice. We give you the four answers it wants.

Yes, and the timing is the point. PIPA has been fully in force since 1 January 2025 and the notification duty bites without undue delay, which means the report is usually written while the exposure is still live or has only just been closed.

What the Commissioner needs is what the exposed page showed at the moment you found it: the directory listing, the leak site post, the cached profile, the misconfigured index. Those change or vanish quickly, and a description written a week later is not the same artefact. Capture it as a sealed package first, then report. Note also that altering, hiding or destroying evidence during a Commissioner inquiry is an offence, so a tamper-evident record protects the organisation as much as it documents the breach.

Substantially, and it answers a different question. Bermuda notaries are Bermuda Bar members enrolled through the Registrar of the Supreme Court, and their time is billed by the hour. A notarial certificate attests what was shown to the notary on the day.

It does not hash the file. Nothing in the certificate lets anyone recompute, months later, that the copy you are producing is byte-identical to the one that was certified, which is exactly what section 27E(2)(c) and section 14(2)(b) ask about. A ProofSnap package costs a fraction of an hour of notarial time, takes 41 seconds, and produces a record the other side can verify without trusting either of us. If your matter needs a notary for a separate reason, the two are not alternatives.

Forensic mode is an optional, deeper form of capture included in the Professional, Enterprise and Company plans (not in Essential or the SnapPacks).

It adds a complete archive of the page's network layer: every HTTP request and response (network.har), a WARC copy of the page, all loaded resources, and the full TLS certificate chain. To capture that it attaches the debugger (the browser shows a "being debugged" banner).

Every one of those files is hashed into the RSA-4096 signed manifest, so the OpenTimestamps blockchain anchor and the eIDAS qualified timestamp cover the network archive exactly as they cover the screenshot.