Screenshots get taken apart in Bahamian courts.
ProofSnap doesn't.

ProofSnap is a Chrome and Edge extension that captures web pages as legal evidence with blockchain timestamping, so the authenticity and integrity of the files can be checked independently.

ProofSnap uses OpenTimestamps to anchor a SHA-256 hash of your evidence to the Bitcoin blockchain, creating a cryptographic proof of when the capture was made. This timestamp is independently verifiable and cannot be backdated or tampered with, providing independently checkable proof that your evidence existed at a specific point in time.

ProofSnap includes a 7-day free trial with all plans. The trial requires a credit card, and you are not charged if you cancel before it ends. Choose from flexible monthly or annual subscriptions: Essential, $8.99 per month or $80 per year; Professional, $16.99 per month or $160 per year; Enterprise, $28.99 per month or $280 per year. Annual plans save 20%.

ProofSnap generates forensically sound evidence with cryptographic proofs aligned with eIDAS 2 standards for qualified timestamps and digital signatures. Admissibility depends on jurisdiction and specific legal requirements. Consult a Bahamian counsel and attorney about your own matter.

Regular screenshots can be challenged in court because they carry no proof of when they were taken or whether they have been altered. In The Bahamas the first half of that problem is largely solved for you: section 12(1) of the ECTA stops the rules of evidence denying admissibility just because a communication is electronic. What remains is the half that decides cases, and section 12(3) makes sure you cannot skip it: the section 61 conditions still apply. Section 12(2) asks how reliably the communication was generated and stored, how reliably its integrity was maintained, and how the originator was identified. Each is a technical fact you can demonstrate or fail to demonstrate.

ProofSnap addresses this by creating a forensic evidence package containing a SHA-256 hash proving the content has not been modified, an RSA-4096 digital signature for authenticity, an eIDAS qualified timestamp issued by Disig a.s., a Qualified Trust Service Provider on the EU Trusted List, a Bitcoin blockchain anchor, and full metadata including the URL and the capture time in UTC. The presumption goes to the time and the integrity of the data rather than to admissibility generally or to the truth of what the page said, so a court or an adjudicator still weighs the evidence. What it removes is the argument about when the capture was made and whether it changed afterwards.

No. The Bahamas is an independent Commonwealth country, was never connected to the EU, and the presumption in Article 41(2) of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 does not run here.

Section 12(2) of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act is what a Bahamian court actually applies, and an independently verifiable qualified timestamp goes directly to the first two factors it lists: the reliability of the manner in which the communication was generated and the reliability of the manner in which its integrity was maintained. That is evidential weight, not a presumption, and it is a stronger pitch than claiming a privilege the statute does not give.

ProofSnap uses three layers of cryptographic protection:

1. SHA-256 Hashing: Every file in the evidence package is hashed. Changing even a single pixel or character produces a completely different hash, making any tampering immediately detectable.
2. Digital Signature: The manifest (listing all files and their hashes) is digitally signed with a private key. The corresponding public key is included for anyone to verify authenticity.
3. Blockchain Timestamp: The manifest hash is anchored to the Bitcoin blockchain via OpenTimestamps, creating an immutable record of when the evidence was captured. This timestamp cannot be forged or backdated.

Together, these mechanisms create a chain of integrity that proves that the evidence is authentic and unaltered, and that it was captured at a specific point in time.

Regulation (EU) 2024/1183, known as eIDAS 2, will be fully rolled out by the end of 2026, establishing stricter standards for electronic identification, digital signatures, and qualified electronic timestamps across all EU member states.

Under Article 41(2), a qualified electronic time stamp shall enjoy the presumption of the accuracy of the date and the time it indicates and the integrity of the data to which the date and time are bound. That presumption operates in the European Union. It does not reach The Bahamas, which is an independent Commonwealth country that was never connected to the EU, so before a Bahamian court the qualified timestamp is corroboration of time and integrity rather than a statutory presumption. Section 12(2) of the ECTA is what a Bahamian court actually applies, and it asks about exactly the reliability and integrity the timestamp evidences.

ProofSnap's cryptographic proofs align with eIDAS 2 requirements: SHA-256 hashing for data integrity, RSA-4096 digital signatures for authenticity, and blockchain timestamps via OpenTimestamps for independent time verification. Each of those is verifiable offline by anyone, which is what makes the package useful in a Bahamian proceeding and, where a matter also touches Europe, in an EU one.

Usually yes, and then the work starts. Section 12(1) of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act says nothing in the rules of evidence denies admissibility to an electronic communication solely because it is in electronic form.

But section 12(3) is the trap: that subsection "shall not affect the application of sections 61 and 67 of the Evidence Act". So admissibility under the ECTA does not relieve you of the section 61 conditions, one of which is that the computer was operating properly throughout the material part of the period. Section 12(2) then sets four factors for weight: the reliability of the manner in which the communication was generated, stored or transmitted, the reliability of the manner in which its integrity was maintained, the manner in which the originator was identified, and any other relevant factor.

The Bahamas kept the pre-1995 English computer-evidence regime on both sides. Section 61 governs civil proceedings and sets four conditions, including section 61(2)(c), that throughout the material part of the period the computer was operating properly or that any malfunction did not affect the production of the document or the accuracy of its contents. Section 61(6) defines a computer as "any device for storing and processing information".

Section 67 covers criminal proceedings and is stricter: a computer-produced statement is not admissible unless there are no reasonable grounds to believe it inaccurate through improper use and the computer was operating properly. Section 67(5) makes a knowingly false certificate an offence. If your matter has a criminal dimension, plan for the stricter test.

It has to be signed by a person occupying a responsible position in relation to the operation of the relevant device, and it identifies the document, describes the manner in which it was produced, gives particulars of the device and deals with the section 61 conditions.

The person matters as much as the content. In Maurice Johnson v Bahamas Waste Limited the objection succeeded because the HR manager tendering a GPS call log did not hold a responsible position relative to the computer and GPS system. The document only got in once an IT technician swore the certificate. The court accepted that certificate as sufficient to prove the authenticity and reliability of the document. A ProofSnap package supplies the underlying facts at capture time: the chain of custody is the manner of production, the forensic log and extension integrity record are the particulars of the device, and the Provenance Certificate speaks to proper operation.

Part 28 governs disclosure and rule 28.4 sets standard disclosure as documents that are "directly relevant", a narrower test than the old train-of-enquiry approach. "Document" is given the widest possible meaning and the Practice Guide expressly includes computer files and databases in its examples.

What is missing is any guidance on electronic disclosure: no protocol, no ESI questionnaire, no metadata rule, no native-format requirement. Three years into a brand new code, practitioners are working it out matter by matter. That makes a described, repeatable capture method genuinely useful, because you can annex it rather than argue about it. Watch rule 28.18 as well: authenticity is deemed admitted unless a notice to prove is served not less than forty-two days before trial.

That is the objection every screenshot invites, and with a plain image there is no answer to it beyond your own word. In The Bahamas the allegation is that the file was altered after capture, and that is answered with bytes, not with credibility.

A ProofSnap package answers the objection from the file. Every file carries a SHA-256 hash, the manifest listing those hashes is signed with an RSA-4096 key, the public key travels with the package, and the verification scripts recompute all of it in front of whoever is asking. Change one pixel and the hash no longer matches. That is also what lets you speak to section 61(2)(c), whether the computer was operating properly, and to a section 61(4) certificate.

Because section 62(3)(c) of the Evidence Act makes the weight of a computer statement turn on whether the information was recorded contemporaneously with the facts it deals with, and on whether anyone concerned had an incentive to conceal or misrepresent them. Evidence created before the dispute crystallises carries more weight than evidence assembled after it.

There is a second reason specific to The Bahamas. Section 20(1) of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act obliges an intermediary with actual knowledge that information gives rise to liability to remove it as soon as practicable, and to notify the police. There is no counter-notice procedure and no duty to preserve a copy. Removal here is a legal duty, not an accident, so the page you need may be deleted precisely because someone did the right thing.

That is the point of the package. Every ProofSnap ZIP ships with verification scripts, the public key and a manifest listing the SHA-256 hash of every file. The other side runs the script on their own hardware, recomputes the hashes and checks the RSA-4096 signature. Nothing depends on us being reachable, in business, or trusted.

That matters more in a small jurisdiction than in a large one. There is no Bahamian web-capture vendor to send a witness, and flying one in from abroad for an authenticity point is disproportionate in most matters. A record that verifies itself removes the question rather than answering it. It also helps the opponent decide, before the 42-day notice to prove deadline under rule 28.18, that challenging authenticity is not worth a trial day.

Capture it before anything else happens. Open the page, run the capture, and keep the package unopened. The result is a ZIP of 11 to 15 files depending on your plan: the screenshot, the page source, the DOM text, a SHA-256 hash of every file, an RSA-4096 signed manifest, the public key, a chain of custody, a forensic log and verification scripts.

Then work out who signs. Section 61(4) of the Evidence Act, Chapter 65 wants a person in a responsible position relative to the device, describing the manner of production and the particulars of the device and dealing with the section 61 conditions. The package gives that person the facts to attest to. If the matter has a criminal dimension, plan for section 67 instead, which is stricter and carries an offence for a knowingly false certificate.

Forensic mode is an optional, deeper form of capture included in the Professional, Enterprise and Company plans (not in Essential or the SnapPacks).

It adds a complete archive of the page's network layer: every HTTP request and response (network.har), a WARC copy of the page, all loaded resources, and the full TLS certificate chain. To capture that it attaches the debugger (the browser shows a "being debugged" banner).

Every one of those files is hashed into the RSA-4096 signed manifest, so the OpenTimestamps blockchain anchor and the eIDAS qualified timestamp cover the network archive exactly as they cover the screenshot.